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COMMENTS
"Obviously, however, one cannot be punished for failing
to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself
violative of the Constitution."
42
Conclusion
In conclusion, no one should ever be counseled to resist an
arrest. The possible danger to the person should always be con-
sidered, and the civil damages recoverable should be weighed
against the inconvenience and indignity of the illegal arrest.
However, although there is yet no direct jurisprudence on the
issue of the existence of a constitutional right to resist an un-
lawful arrest, this writer firmly believes that such a right is
necessarily implicit in both the Fourth Amendment and in the
concept of due process of law. To those who believe that resistance
to any arrest has the disasterous effect of condoning disrespect
for law and proper legal authority, it should be emphasized:
"The purpose of the right is not to encourage violent attacks
on policemen, but to preserve the sense of personal liberty
inherent in the right to reject arbitrary orders. To permit
the police to provoke individuals into committing the crime
of resisting arrest, creates a trap for citizens which must, in
the long run, injure the integrity of the legal system.' '48
Allan L. Durand
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE ARREST PROCESS
In recent years, police officers and police departments have
been recipients of an ever-increasing barrage of accusations and
denunciations concerning alleged police brutality. This fact is
especially true with regard to the use of deadly force in effecting
arrests. Positions, both pro and con, have been supported with
equal vehemence, leaving the individual police forces, to a large
degree, occupying a rather undesirable middle-ground between
the extremes. A large portion of the difficulty in this area has
stemmed from confusion and misconception, on the part of both
police officers and society, as to the exact extent of an officer's
42. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1962).
43. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L. J. 1128,
1150 (1969).
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rights and duties in the use of deadly force while apprehending
fleeing lawbreakers. It is the purpose of this comment to explore
and to clarify the prevailing law on this subject, with particular
emphasis upon the rights and duties of police officers to use
deadly force' in the apprehension of fleeing felons. In addition,
a discussion of the available remedies for redress of harm caused
by the unauthorized use of force is included. It should be em-
phasized that only a very narrow band in the spectrum of use of
deadly force is here under consideration. The right of a police
officer to use deadly force, in self-defense or in defense of others,
in the appropriate circumstances, is not of primary concern, as
there seems to be little quarrel with this aspect of the law. Ad-
ditionally, what is forthcoming should be read with the thought
in mind that, generally speaking, the police officer is under a
duty to go forward and to effect an arrest, where it is called for,
and is not required to retreat in the face of resistance.2
The term "felon" originated in European feudalism-a social,
economic and military system based on mutual obligation be-
tween lord and vassal, in which the unforgiveable sin was the
breach of fealty.8 Such feudal disloyalty was a threat to the en-
tire social structure and therefore merited the severest sanctions
available, such as forfeiture of all property and usually capital or
corporeal punishment.4 Breaches of feudal obligations thus pun-
ished were labeled felonies. The English common law adopted
this terminology and imposed like sanctions for serious breaches
of the King's peace such as homicide, arson, rape and robbery.5
As the concept of the felon evolved, the rule emerged that
a police officer, or even a private citizen, could with impunity
kill a felon to prevent his escape, as most felonies were extremely
serious and dangerous crimes and all felonies were punishable
by death. In many cases, the death penalty was preceded by
mutilation or dismemberment of the body in public spectacles
1. For the purposes of this comment, the term "deadly force" will be de-
fined as that force which causes death or creates a substantial risk of
causing death or serious bodily harm. The basic situation which is con-
templated is that of a police officer attempting to arrest a fleeing suspect.
Riot situations, tantamount to civil insurrection, because of the very special
nature of the problems involved are considered to be without the scope of
this Comment.
2. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 452 (1957).
3. See Comment, 53 VA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1967).
4. Id. at 407. See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 95.
5. Comment, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967). See also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 358 (1923).
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calculated to serve as examples to other potential wrongdoers.
This theory of crime and punishment involved the notion that
anyone who would risk such terrible consequences by committing
a crime must indeed be a desperate character. Consequently, it
was imperative that such persons be immediately apprehended
by any available means, in order to prevent them from laying
waste the surrounding countryside. In light of this attitude to-
ward law enforcement, it made very little difference whether the
suspected criminal was killed in the chase or whether he was
captured alive. In any event, he was sure in most cases to meet
his end at the hands of the courts in prescribing his punishment.
Not only did the peace officers of the time have the right and
the duty to either apprehend or kill the suspect, but the average
citizen was impressed into the hunt by a device which was known
in early England as posse comitatus.7 When the hue and cry8
was raised either by the local police officer or by any private
citizen, all inhabitants were duty-bound to pursue the felon and
use their best efforts to either capture or kill him. Because of
this early vigilante action, the rights of a private citizen in the
apprehension of a criminal for many years closely paralleled
those of a duly appointed police officer. Consequently, the rule
evolved that one may kill a felon in order to prevent his escape.
It is significant that the rule was established at a time when
practically all crimes were felonies and all felonies were punish-
able by death. It must be conceded that this original premise
behind the rule has changed, as no longer are all crimes felonies
nor are all felonies punishable by death. Indeed, fundamental
assumptions concerning the propriety of capital punishment,
after guilt has been adjudged in an adversary proceeding, are
under very serious attack. It is imperative, therefore, that the
present jurisprudence and statutory law be examined to see what
effect the erosion of the underlying principle of the deadly force
rule has had on the existence of the rule itself.
The general rule which prevails today among a majority of
the American jurisdictions which have considered the matter is
that if a felony has been committed and the felon flees from
justice, it is the duty of every policeman to use his best endeavors
6. E. FISHER, LAws or ARREST 124-126 (1967).
7. Id. at 354. From Latin: posse, meaning power or ability, plus
comitatus, meaning of the county or other European noblemen.
8. Id. at 360. "Hue and cry was the old common law custom of pursuing
suspected felons with horn and with voice."
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to prevent an escape. If in the pursuit the felon is killed where
he cannot be otherwise arrested, the homicide is justifiable. 9 An
officer endeavoring to arrest a known felon has the right to use
all the force reasonably necessary to make the arrest, including
taking the life of the fleeing criminal.'0 However, this general
rule has been qualified in several significant respects. It is well
established that an officer may never use deadly force simply to
apprehend a person who has committed only a misdemeanor."
The reason usually given for this is that the interests of society
in effecting the immediate apprehension of a misdemeanant is
not so great as to justify the taking of his life in order to ac-
complish that result.1 2
An initial requirement to be fulfilled before the law officer
may come within the privilege to use deadly force in making
a felony arrest is that the arrest be legal.'3 The legality of an
arrest for these purposes varies among jurisdictions. Generally,
the arrest is considered valid if the arresting officer is aware that
a valid warrant has been issued for the suspect's arrest or if
the officer himself witnesses the consummation of the crime.' 4
However, in the situation where a warrant has not been issued,
and the arrest is based on probable cause alone, the privilege
does not apply unless the suspect is a felon in fact.15 Thus a
9. Union Indem. Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 118 So. 794 (1928); Johnson
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S.W.2d 521 (1935); Young v. Amis,
220 Ky. 484, 295 S.W. 431 (1927); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E.
375 (1927); Jones v. Penketh, 31 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 161 (1933); Commonwealth
v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 A. 211 (1922); Thompson v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 182
S.E. 880 (W. Va. 1935).
10. Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 55 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1932); United States
v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923); State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103
N.W. 944 (1905).
11. Weissengoff v. Davis, 260 F. 16 (4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S.
674 (1919); United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923); Suell v. Derri-
crott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895 (1909); Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W.
591 (1925); Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166, 129 S.E. 772 (1925); Petrie v.
Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185,
136 S.E. 375 (1927).
12. See Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest,
33 NEB. L. REv. 408 (1954).
13. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 452 (1957);
Demato v. People, 49 Colo. 147, 111 P. 703 (1910); Carter v. State, 30 Tex.
App. 551, 17 S.W. 1102 (1891).
14. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 213.
15. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 452 (1957);
Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1219 (1959); Note, 21 U. PrrT. L. REV.
132, 133 (1959); Note, 5 WASHBURN L.J. 262 (1966); Union Indem. Co. v.
Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 118 So. 794 (1928); Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 P.
869 (1918); Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S.W.2d 521
(1935); Young v. Amis, 220 Ky. 484, 295 S.W. 431 (1927); Petrie v. Cartwright,
114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); McKeon v. National Cas. Co., 216 Mo. App. 507,
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majority of American jurisdictions hold that even though a po-
lice officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect and even
though the use of deadly force is reasonably necessary to effect
such arrest, its use is unreasonable unless the officer knows
that the fleeing suspect has committed a felony.,le This modifica-
tion of the deadly force rule finds support in one particularly
famous Kentucky case. In Petrie v. Cartwright,17 the deceased
became engaged in a scuffle over some comments made by two
men regarding the deceased's wife. The deceased knocked one
man down, the other man pulled a knife, and the deceased at-
tempted to flee for his life. At this precise instant a police officer
arrived on the scene and came to the conclusion that the de-
ceased had committed a felony and was fleeing. The officer fired
upon and killed the deceased. The Kentucky court of appeals
held that the officer was not warranted in using deadly force
where only a suspicion of a felony existed.13
270 S.W. 707 (1925); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927);
Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
16. Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest, 33 NE.
L. REv. 408, 409 (1954): "Does the rule that an officer can kill if it appears
reasonably necessary to do so to effect an arrest for an atrocious felony
extend to those cases where the officer does not see the felony committed
but Is nevertheless able to make a valid arrest without a warrant upon
reasonable belief? It does not; in such cases the officer kills the arrestee at
his peril. If It turns out that an atrocious felony was not committed in fact
or that if one was committed the arrestee did not commit it, he is not pro-
tected. This is a natural result of a rational interpretation of the rule as
to the amount of force that may be used by the officer in making an arrest.
He may use reasonable force. When he sees an atrocious felony committed,
the law considers that the force used Is no more than reasonable if he finds
it necessary to go so far as to kill the arrestee if that appears reasonably
necessary to prevent the escape of the arrestee. But by the weight of au-
thority the law balks-and wisely-at taking the additional step of consider-
ing It reasonable to kill one who is only reasonably believed to have com-
mitted an atrocious felony. It is reasonable to arrest him under such
circumstances but unreasonable to kill him although it reasonably appears
necessary to do so to complete the arrest."
17. 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902). See Note, 38 KY. L.J. 609 (1950). See
also Note, 38 KY. L.J. 618 (1950) for a contra view.
18. Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 106, 109-10, 70 S.W. 297, 298-99
(1902): "The jury were warranted in concluding from all the evidence that
Petrie had in fact committed no felony .... We have been unable to find
any common-law authority justifying an officer in killing a person sought to
be arrested who fled from him, where the officer acted upon suspicion, and
no felony had in fact been committed. The common-law rule allowing an
officer to kill a felon in order to arrest him rests upon the idea that felons
ought not be at large, and that the life of the felon has been forfeited; for
felonies at common-law were punishable by death. But where no felony has
been committed the reason of the rule does not apply, and it seems to us
that the sacredness of human life and the danger of abuse do not permit
an extension of the common-law rule to cases of suspected felonies. ...
The notion that a peace officer may in all cases shoot one who flees from
him when about to be arrested is unfounded. Officers have no such power,
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Another variation involves the situation where an officer
knows for a fact that a felony has been committed and uses
deadly force to effect an arrest only to find out that the victim
was not the felon. A leading case in this area, Commonwealth
v. Duerr9 concerned a situation where the police apprehended
a car thief who told them of a rendezvous with his accomplices.
The police laid a trap but captured the wrong men. The suspects
bolted and deadly force was used to make the arrest. It was
held that the police were not justified in killing the suspects,
even though they knew a felony had been committed and
reasonably believed the suspects had committed the felony, as
the suspects had not in fact committed the crime.
' The rationale behind the restriction which requires that a
felony must have in fact been committed by the suspect before
an officer is justified in using deadly force in the arrest process
is aimed at the abolition of the indiscriminate use of deadly force
by police officers which could otherwise, after the fact, be justi-
fied by the officer's mere assertion of his reasonable belief that
the suspect was a felon.20 However, such stringent requirements
have been criticized on the basis that they restrict law enforce-
ment officers too greatly, and, in fact, it has been argued that
the law, as such, hampers its own enforcement. 21 It has also been
contended that there is a growing trend away from such strict
requirements of knowledge; 22 however, more recent writings
have reflected the opinion that the trend is in reality toward
requiring police officers to possess knowledge that the suspect
except in cases of felony, and there as a last resort, after all other means
have failed. It is never allowed where the offense is only a misdemeanor;
and where there is only a suspicion of felony the officer is not warranted
in treating the fugitive as a felon. If he does this, he does so at his peril,
and is liable if it turns out that he is mistaken. He may lawfully arrest
upon a suspicion of felony, but he is only warranted in using such force in
making the arrest as is allowable in other cases not felonious, unless the
offense was in fact a felony." (Emphasis added.)
19. 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
20. See Note, 38 KY. L.J. 609, 614 (1950).
21. See Comment, 38 Ky. L.J. 618 (1950).
22. Note, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 132, 140 (1959): "The rule of law has swung
like a pendulum from one extreme where any person in flight from arrest
could be shot at with impunity, to a position where no one could be shot at
unless certain stringent conditions were met and a certain situation was in
fact true, i.e. the commission of a felony by the person in flight. It now
appears that the pendulum is swinging toward the extreme once more but
that reason, justice and morality will prevent its complete orbit back to that
point of barbarity which existed in earlier times. . . . [The police officer]
should be allowed the right to his reasonable beliefs and trained suspicions
which arise from his education in the methods of law and his study of the
operations and characteristics of the criminal element of society."
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was indeed a felon.23 The latter view seems more in accord with
the concern of modern society for the limitation of use of deadly
force and for the sanctity of human life.
In addition to the several internal limitations (knowledge
requirements) on the deadly force rule, there are growing ex-
ternal forces which threaten to topple the very framework of
the rule itself. The deadly force rule has always been framed
around the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy due to the early
death-dealing nature of the crimes which were then felonies.24
The very basis of the fleeing felon rule was that the felon had
committed a vile and heinous crime for which he would un-
doubtedly be executed if brought to trial. However, with the ad-
vent of a large number of statutory, non-dangerous felonies, the
distinction as to the use of deadly force between felonies and
misdemeanors becomes questionable and indeed has been chal-
lenged as being of relatively little value.25 As the nature of the
term "felony" has changed, there has appeared a trend toward
making a distinction between those felonies which are dangerous
to human life and those which are not.20 Particularly striking
examples of the questionable nature of the distinction between
some felonies and misdemeanors can be seen in cases of non-
violent property offenses. In Louisiana, the theft of $100.00 is
a felony, whereas the theft of $99.00 is a misdemeanorYr Under
the present scheme, the thief in the former case may be shot in
order to prevent his escape, whereas the thief in the latter case
may not. Could such a result be morally or pragmatically justi-
fied? It is submitted that in neither case should deadly force be
applied, as the crime itself is not inherently dangerous to human
23. See, e.g., Note, 5 WASHBURN L.J. 262, 269 (1966): "Probably the trend
is toward requiring arrestors to know with certainty that the person to be
arrested is a felon before deadly force can be used to effectuate the arrest.
No doubt there will be attempts in the future to further limit the use of
deadly force in arrest .... "
24. Weissengoff v. Davis, 260 F. 16 (4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S.
674 (1919); United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923); Suell v.
Derricrott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895 (1909); Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276
S.W. 591 (1925); Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166, 129 S.E. 772 (1925); Petrie v.
Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C.
185, 135 S.E. 375 (1927).
25. Comment, 33 NEB. L. REV. 408 (1954).
26. United States v. Clark, 31 F. 710, 713 (D.C. Mich. 1887); State v.
Turner, 190 La. 198, 182 So. 325 (1938); State v. Ciaccio, 163 La. 563, 112 So.
486 (1927); State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327 (1871); Reneau v. State, 2 Lea
(Tenn.) 720, 31 Am. Rep. 626 (1879). See also the recent case of Sauls v.
Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969).
27. LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1970).
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life, nor is it harshly punished as it might have been under the
old common law. If the basis of the fleeing felon rule was once
that the felon had forfeited his life by his crime and could there-
fore be killed to prevent his escape,2 then, as illustrated by the
example, the rationale for the rule is no longer present, at least
for many of our lesser felonies. Therefore, it is submitted that in
seeking to delineate between those types of crimes for which
deadly force may be used to apprehend the perpetrator and
those for which it may not be used, the felony-misdemeanor
distinction is useless. Alternately, it is suggested that deadly
force should only be used where the death-dealing nature of
the crime involved requires that the arresting officer return force
in kind to make the arrest.
In most American jurisdictions, a further limitation on the
fleeing felon rule is that a police officer has the right to kill a
fleeing felon (all other conditions satisfied) to prevent his escape,
only if he could prevent it in no other way.29 The standard
generally adhered to is not one of actual necessity but is that
of reasonable necessity. 80 The law allows the officer this amount
of discretion after all other requirements are met. Courts will
not and probably should not second guess an officer as to this
requirement which necessitates, more than any other require-
ment, an on-the-spot, individual determination by the officer in
question. In this vein, it should be noted that an officer almost
universally has the option to call for assistance if necessary, to
effect an arrest.81 However, it has been held that the requirement
that he exhaust all other possible avenues of arrest before using
deadly force does not include the summoning of assistance from
bystanders.82
The Louisiana jurisprudence appears to early have adopted
the general rule that a fleeing felon could be killed if it were
28. E. FISHER, LAWS o ARREST 124-26 (1967).
29. J. HAWLEY, THE LAW Or ARREST 31 (1891); Richards v. Burgin, 159 Ala.
282, 49 So. 294 (1909); State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905);
Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1921).
30. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 452, 459
(1957); Richards v. Burgin, 159 Ala. 282, 49 So. 294 (1909); State v. Smith,
127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905); Cornett v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 236,
248 S.W. 540 (1923); Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1922).
31. Monterey County v. Rader, 248 P. 912 (1926); Cornett v. Common-
wealth, 198 Ky. 236, 248 S.W. 540 (1923); Caperton v. Commonwealth, 189
Ky. 652, 225 S.W. 481 (1920); Commonwealth v. Sadowsky, 80 Pa. Super.
496 (1922).
32. Daniel v. State, 23 Ala. App. 188, 122 So. 306 (1929).
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necessary to prevent his escape.83 However, here too, several
exceptions to and refinements of the general rule have developed.
As with the other American jurisdictions, Louisiana has adhered
to the general exception which protects fleeing misdemeanants
from apprehension by deadly force.8 4 Further, early Louisiana
cases indicate a predisposition to establish a distinction between
felonies accompanied by violence and the so-called silent fel-
onies.835 Illustrative of this class of cases is Carmouche v. Bouis,86
wherein the owner of a slave sued for the value of his slave after
he had been killed by the defendant on the defendant's property.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held for the plaintiff, reasoning
that the dead slave had been in the act of committing, at worst,
only a felony not attended by violence and hence his death was
not justifiable. Thus, early in the judicial history of our state,
the courts thought that there should be a distinction made be-
tween forcible violent felonies which entail serious danger to
human life and the lesser non-violent felonies which usually
constitute only offenses against property. They concluded that
in the former situation deadly force may indeed be justifiable
to effect the arrest of the felon, but in the latter instance the
gravity and punishment of the crime were not such that the
felon should be considered as having forfeited his life. 7
This distinction between the use of deadly force in petty
crimes and its use in serious violent crimes, as announced in
the Carmouche case, appeared to be again sanctioned by Lou-
33. State v. Turner, 190 La. 198, 182 So. 325 (1938); State v. Plumlee, 177
La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1938); Carmouche v. Bouis, 6 La. Ann. 95 (1851). The
right was also impliedly recognized in Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 La. Ann.
732 (1859), and Bibb v. Hebert, 3 La. Ann. 132 (1848).
34. See cases cited note 33 supra. See also Graham v. Ogden, 157 So.2d
365 (La App. 3d Cir. 1963).
35. Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 La. Ann. 732 (1859); Carmouche v. Bouis,
6 La. Ann. 95 (1851); Bibb v. Hebert, 3 La. Ann. 132 (1848). Note that these
cases concern private individuals rather than law officers. However, it is
submitted that the holdings should have been applicable to the police of
the time since private individuals then had much the same rights to ap-
prehend criminals as did peace officers.
36. 6 La. Ann. 95 (1851).
37. Id. at 97: "But in the case before us, the necessity to wound or kill,
which a case of intended robbery may present, did not exist. The cane the
negroes were about to take, is not of that class of things for which men
commit a robbery, or take by putting the owner in fear. The trespassers in-
tended to commit a misdemeanor, and not a crime. Homicide is not justifiable
to prevent mere misdemeanor, or even felonies without force, such as pick-
ing pockets. Less dangerous means should have been resorted to even at
the risk of failing to detect and arrest the trespassers." See also State v.
Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1933).
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isiana's highest court in the case of State v. Turner.8 The court
affirmed a policeman's conviction for manslaughter where the
evidence showed that he had shot and killed a suspect who was
seen driving away from the vicinity of a junkyard after dark.
The court, in rather broad language, held that the defendant
had reasonable belief, at best, to suspect that the decedent had
committed only larceny and therefore the use of deadly force
was not available in attempting an arrest.8 9 Testimony as to
the value of the materials present in the junkyard was allowed
in order to determine whether the officer had reasonable ground
to believe that a felony had been committed. The initimation here
is that the killing of the suspect might have been justified had
the officer had a reasonable belief that a felony had been com-
mitted. This is contrary to the rule in a majority of the other
American law jurisdictions which require knowledge that a
felony has been committed.4° It is submitted that in this case,
the use of deadly force was also inappropriate because it was
not reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. The officer did not
need to use such "last resort means" as the suspect could have
been identified by simply taking down the license and description
of the car.
Another important case in this area is Britt v. Merritt,
41
which involved a deputy sheriff's attempt to halt an alleged
liquor law violator in order to search his vehicle. When the
38. 190 La. 198, 202-03, 182 So. 325, 327 (1938): "If any point is settled,
or can be settled, it is that larceny, being a secret crime not attended with
force or violence, and especially when the goods taken are of small value,
furnishes no warrant to one person for killing another to prevent its con-
summation." It is submitted that if a person could not kill to prevent a crime
then certainly he may not kill to apprehend the criminal. See Sauls v. Hutto,
304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969).
39. State v. Turner, 190 La. 198, 182 So. 325 (1938). The court cites with
approval Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 La. Ann. 732 (1859); Carmouche v. Bouis,
6 La. Ann. 95 (1851); Bibb v. Hebert, 3 La. Ann. 132 (1848). It also seems to
approve with respect to policemen the doctrine of State v. Plumlee, 177 La.
687, 149 So. 425 (1933), that the crime involved must not be a petty offense,
but rather a serious crime attended by fear of bodily injury or death, before
deadly force may be used to effect the arrest.
40. See 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 452
(1957); Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1219 (1959); Note, 21 U. PITT. L. REv.
132, 133 (1959); Note, 5 WASHBURN L.J. 262 (1966); Union Indem. Co. v.
Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 118 So. 794 (1928); Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 P.
869 (1918); Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S.W.2d 521
(1935); Young v. Amis, 220 Ky. 484, 295 S.W. 431 (1927); Petrie v. Cartwright,
114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); McKeon v. National Cas. Co., 216 Mo. App.
507, 270 S.W. 707 (1925); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927);
Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
41. 45 So.2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
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man would not stop, the deputy shot and killed him to prevent
his escape. The deputy in a civil suit for damages pleaded self-
defense claiming that the decedent had attempted to run him
down.4 2 The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit found that
the homicide was not justifiable. They concluded that the deputy
was attempting to arrest the decedent for an alleged violation
of the liquor laws and said, "It is fair to conclude that he (the
deputy) decided, as many deputies would erroneously have done,
that he was authorized to effect arrest even though it required
the most drastic method."43 It is open to some conjecture why
the court felt the use of deadly force was inappropriate. It is
possible that they felt that the deputy did not have enough in-
formation to reasonably believe that a crime had been committed,
hence, there would have been no basis for a valid arrest as
there had been no warrant issued. Therefore, if the deputy could
not have validly arrested the decedent based on the information
he had, certainly he could not have killed him in order to effect
the arrest.44 However, in view of the fact that Louisiana adheres
to the notion that in a determination of probable cause, flight
by the suspect is a legitimate ground for an inference of guilt,
this appears to be the less probable of the two alternatives.4 5
However, it is possible that the court wished to follow the line
of reasoning illustrated by the Carmouche46 case. In view of
these cases, it must be concluded that there is a jurisprudential
basis in Louisiana for a division of crimes based upon the deadly
nature of the crime rather than the artificial felony-misdemeanor
criterion, at least where the use of deadly force is concerned.
It could be argued that the court's interpretation of the law
in the Britt case was in direct conflict with statutory authority
which existed at that time.47 Louisiana Revised Statutes Title
15, Section 64 provided that an officer participating in a lawful
42. Id. The court found that the deputy was hiding in the woods and as
the decedent drove by the deputy yelled for him to stop and when the de-
cedent did not, the deputy killed him.
43. Britt v. Merritt, 45 So.2d 902, 907 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). Note that
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff (decedent's wife and children) and against the Sheriff and the
Sheriff's surety was reversed. The judgment against the defendant Merritt
was affirmed. Britt v. Merritt, 219 La. 333, 53 So.2d 121 (1951).
44. LA. R.S. 15:64 (1950).
45. State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966).
46. Carmouche v. Bouis, 6 La. Ann. 95 (1851).
47. IA. R.S. 15:64 (1950). "Every one must submit peaceably to a lawful
arrest, and, if he resists, any person lawfully arresting him may use such
force as may be necessary to overcome the resistance."
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arrest may use such force as may be necessary to overcome the
resistance of a suspect. Presumably "resistance" would be under-
stood in a broad sense and could include resistance by flight.
There does not appear to be any limit on the amount of force
allowed nor any qualification that it be reasonable to the situa-
tion. It would follow, that if in the Britt case, the deputy had
been effecting a lawful arrest, there was statutory sanction for
his use of any force necessary to effect the arrest, even if deadly.48
Under a literal reading of this statute, a person could be killed
to prevent flight even if guilty only of a misdemeanor. Such a
result surely could not have been intended by the legislature.
Therefore, the conclusion is persuasive that this statute was not
intended to apply to criminals in flight, but only to those who
actually put up physical resistance. Clearly then, the arresting
officer could use such force as was necessary to overcome the
resistance.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that when Louisi-
ana's Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1966, there
was a provision expressly dealing with the use of force in effect-
ing an arrest as contrasted to that used in overcoming resist-
ance.49 Instead of characterizing the permitted force as that
necessary to effect the arrest, article 2200 provides that the ar-
resting officer must use only reasonable force in apprehending a
suspect. This article also provides that the use of any force at
all must be pursuant to a lawful arrest.51 Since a police officer
in Louisiana may make a valid arrest based on probable cause,5 2
presumably this article provides a standard different from the
"actual knowledge of the felony" standard which is in use in
a majority of the other American jurisdictions. However, the
Reporter's Comments to Code of Criminal Procedure article 220
indicate that it was the drafter's intention that the force em-
ployed must be "reasonable" both as to the nature and amount
of the force. 8s Therefore, this word change, if it means anything
48. LA. R.S. 15:64 (1950). If the force used to stop Britt were found to
be actually necessary to prevent his escape, then it could be argued that
such a finding under the statute forecloses any inquiry into whether the use
of the force was reasonable to the circumstances.
49. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 220. "A person shall submit peaceably to a
lawful arrest. The person making a lawful arrest may use reasonable force
to effect the arrest and detention, and also to overcome any resistance or
threatened resistance of the person being arrested or detained."
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 213.
53. See LA. CODE! Cusm. P. art. 220, comment (b).
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at all, must mean, not only that an officer may proceed on his
reasonable belief that the force is necessary to effect the arrest,
but also that there may be situations where the use of certain
types of force (e.g., deadly force) would not be warranted simply
because reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. Such a con-
clusion is supported by the fact that there is no separate pro-
vision regarding the use of force in apprehending a misde-
meanant. If the above interpretation is not given to article 220,
then an officer would be statutorily warranted in using deadly
force to capture a misdemeanant if he could not otherwise be
stopped. In this way, the foregoing cases concerning the division,
for the purposes of use of deadly force, of crimes into serious
death-dealing offenses and non-serious "silent" offenses, could
be incorporated into an interpretation of the statute. Thus, while
an officer could proceed upon his reasonable belief, he could not
apply deadly force simply to apprehend a person in flight who
was suspected of committing only one of the so-called "silent
felonies." 54
It should be noted, however, that although this would seem
to be the most appealing interpretation in light of the jurispru-
dence and current social morality, this article is rather gen-
eral in its terms and may be subject to more than one interpre-
tation. The reason for this may lie in the fact that in the Projet
to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was submitted by
the Louisiana State Law Institute for adoption as the new code,
there were three supplemental articles to what was then article
220. 55 From an examination of these articles, it can be seen
that the proposed article 220 was meant as a general introduc-
54. See Carmouche v. Bouis, 6 La. Ann. 95 (1851).
55. Projet of the Code of Criminal Procedure art. 221: " 'Deadly Force'
means force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or great
bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person
or at a vehicle in which another person Is believed to be constitutes deadly
force. A threat to cause death or great bodily harm, by the production of
a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating
an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary does not con-
stitute deadly force."
Projet of the Code of Criminal Procedure art. 222: "Deadly force may
not be used for the purpose of effecting an arrest unless:
(1) The person effecting the arrest is a peace officer;
(2) The arrest is for a felony involving danger to life or of great bodily
harm, and there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested
will cause death or great bodily harm if his arrest Is delayed;
(3) The officer reasonably believes that the force employed creates no
substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and
(4) The officer reasonably believes that an immediate arrest cannot be
made without deadly force."
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tory article to the more specific provisions to follow. For example,
proposed article 222 would have limited the use of deadly force
for these purposes solely to police officers,5 6 and it would have
also restricted the use of deadly force to situations where danger-
ous felonies were involved and where there was a substantial
risk that the felon would cause additional harm to innocent
persons if not immediately apprehended. Basically, these articles
were derived from the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code and represent the prevailing trends in other American
jurisdictions. Had article 222 and its companions been adopted
as proposed by the Louisiana Law Institute, Louisiana would
have had for the first time a comprehensive scheme of law
regarding the use of deadly force in the arrest process. Un-
fortunately, these proposals were deleted and the Code was
enacted containing only present article 220 on this topic.
In view of the rather loosely defined and general state of
Louisiana law on the subject of unauthorized use of force, it is
very difficult to discuss possible remedies which may exist for re-
dressing a transgression of our law. However, some generaliza-
tions may be made. It is, of course, possible to file criminal
charges, under our Criminal Code,57 against a police officer where
deadly force is used to apprehend a suspect. The standard to
which an officer would be held is article 220 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure." However, because of its generality, it is
doubtful whether article 220 would be of practical value in de-
termining whether an officer had used more force than that
which was authorized. In such cases, the courts have, in attempt-
ing to resolve the problem, gravitated toward the use of more
firmly established institutions to provide legal justification. Con-
sequently, there has been a tendency to gloss over the distinc-
tion between the use of deadly force in self-defense and the use of
deadly force to effect an arrest.59 Therefore, pleas of self-defense
have been allowed and held valid where it seems that inquiry
should have been made as to the right to use deadly force
in the arrest procedure.6
56. See Projet of the Code of Criminal Procedure art. 222.
57. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950).
58. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 220.
59. See Roberts v. American Employers Ins. Co., 221 So.2d 550 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969); Greening v. Hill, 221 So.2d 261 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); McKellar
v. Mason, 159 So.2d 700 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
60. See note 59 supra.
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Similarly, a civil action brought to redress damage done by
the unwarranted use of force by police might fall upon equally
barren soil. Both the imprecision with which the line separating
proper conduct from civil transgression is drawn and the difficulty
of procuring the testimony of fellow officers would prove formid-
able barriers to hurdle. In addition, a doctrine which may be
used to deny the plaintiff recovery in a civil action involving
use of excessive force is the so-called aggressor doctrine. Briefly
stated, this doctrine holds that a plaintiff cannot recover civil
damages for injuries if he is at fault in provoking the difficulty
in which the injury is received.,' This is true even though the
person inflicting the injury is criminally responsible . 2 While use
of this doctrine may possibly be appropriate in some self-defense
situations it is submitted that its use to preclude recovery is
inappropriate where a suspect has ceased resistance and is bent
solely on escape. However, some courts have failed to sharply
mark this distinction and have lumped the aggressor doctrine
and the self-defense privilege together to defeat recovery. It is
submitted that the more relevant inquiry might have been into
the use of deadly force to effect an arrest.8 3 Incorporate with these
difficulties, the unfortunate fact that police officers are often un-
able to satisfy even small judgments and the fact of prevailing
61. Robertson v. Polman, 74 So.2d 408 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Britt
v. Merritt, 45 So.2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
62. See Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932), and
cases cited therein; Massett v. Keff, 116 La. 1107, 41 So. 330 (1906); Miller v.
Meche, 111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903); McCurdy v. City Cab Co., 32 So.2d
720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947); Ponthieu v. Coco, 18 So.2d 351 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1944); Welch v. Van Valkenburgh, 189 So. 297 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939); Finkel-
stein v. Naihaus, 151 So. 686 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
Britt v. Merritt, 45 So.2d 902, 905 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950): "It is entirely
possible under the jurisprudence of this state for a person to be properly
charged with and convicted of the killing of another, or of Inflicting great
bodily harm upon him, and the Injured person or his heirs, in case of his
death, be without recourse civilly against the person so charged and con-
victed. This happens when the deceased or injured person provokes, in-
stigates or creates conditions by words or action, of such character as to
make him the aggressor in the difficulty out of which the action Is alleged
to have arisen. For instance, a man may, without provocation, violently
strike another with his fist, they being equal or nearly so in physical
strength, and if the one struck should with a pistol shoot his assailant and
is thereafter charged with and convicted of the shooting, the injured man;
the one who started the difficulty being the aggressor, is without right to
recover civil damages from the other. The fact that the other man is
not excusable for his offense is immaterial in the civil phase of the case."
See also Smith v. Clemnin, 48 So.2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
63. Roberts v. American Employers Ins. Co., 221 So.2d 550 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969); Greening v. Hill, 221 So.2d 261 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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municipal immunity in some jurisdictions, the hope of civil rem-
edy for unlawful use of force diminishes noticeably.
Some light may have been cast on the question of remedies
by a recent federal case, Sauls v. Hutto,64 which was decided
in 1969 by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana (New Orleans Division). There, two officers pursued
a group of boys in a car thought to be stolen. The driver of the
car, the decedent, lost control, and the car was wrecked. The
officers took custody of the other occupants of the car but the
decedent, Sauls, was shot and killed trying to escape. The de-
cedent's natural mother filed this civil suit under section 198365
of Title 42 of the U.S.C.A. The court found for the plaintiff, hold-
ing that it was illegal under Louisiana law to use deadly force
in order to apprehend a person suspected of having committed
only a felony against property involving no danger to life or
limb. In reaching this conclusion, the court read article 22016 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, together with article 20 of the
Criminal Code. 7 The court reasoned that if such force could not
be used to prevent the present crime, neither could it be used
to arrest the offender. Therefore, plaintiff was allowed to recover
for the death of her son. Clearly, this represents an interpretation
by a federal court that Louisiana statutory law does in fact
contain a distinction between crimes which are death-dealing
and those which are not, at least where the concern is the
amount of force which may be used to apprehend those involved.
Consequently, it would seem that the federal courts provide
Louisiana citizens, who have been injured in the manner under
consideration, with legal redress when such suit is brought under
section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S.C.
The question may be posed, however, as to the effectiveness
64. 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party Injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress."
66. A. CODi Ci.m. P. art. 220.
67. LA. R.S. 14:20 (1950). "A homicide is justifiable: (1) When committed
in self-defense. . . , (2) When committed, for the purpose of preventing a
violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm,
by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be com-
mitted and that such action Is necessary for its prevention .. "
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of such a remedy against an individual policeman. This inquiry,
of course, turns upon the availability to the officer-defendant of
sufficient funds from which a contrary judgment could be de-
ducted. It is submitted that the remedy as provided in the
Sauls v. Hutto case is illusory if there is no financially solvent
enterprise which can be reached to satisfy such a judgment. One
answer to this might be a statute which would hold the munici-
pality employing the offending officer liable in solido with that
officer for any such judgment. One Comment on the subject
has reached the conclusion that the general rule which precludes
municipal liability for the tortious conduct of its police is in
a state of flux." He sees the holding of Pierce v. Fidelity Cas.
Co. of N.Y.,"9 that a provision in a city charter that the municipal
corporation has the authority "to sue and be sued" constituted
a waiver of its traditional immunity, will be extended to provide
municipal liability for a policeman's torts. If this were to become
fact, it is submitted that this would be desirable in that it would
put the burden of satisfying such judgments on the enterprise
(the municipality) with the greatest power to improve the police
force and to screen out the type of applicant who might be
prone to use excessive force in the performance of his duty. It
also suggested that the individual-policeman should be given
immunity from damages caused by his negligence in executing
his official acts.7 0 This would seem to be a well-founded sug-
gestion providing that the municipality is found to be liable for
the officer's torts committed during the pursuit of his official
duties. However, a proviso making the offending officer and the
municipality liable in solido for the officer's acts which are com-
mitted in bad faith while on duty would seem to be soundly
advisable in light of the public concern for improvement of the
police force.
In conclusion, it may be said that an examination of the
old rule that a fleeing felon may be killed to prevent his escape,
reveals glaring frailties. Such an indictment finds support in the
simple fact that in many cases the existence of the rule has
outlived the reason for its existence. No longer are all felonies
punishable by death. The increase in the number of these statu-
68. Comment, 29 LA. L. R.v. 130, 139 (1969). See also Musmeci v. Amer.
Auto. Ins. Co., 146 So.2d 497 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
69. 205 So.2d 831 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
70. Comment, 29 LA. L. Rlv. 130, 142 (1969).
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tory non-violent felonies has made the distinction between felony
and misdemeanor arrest, as to which may be accomplished by
deadly force, unrealistic. It is submitted that the cited Louisiana
cases provide a basis for the differentiation of crimes into those
involving physical violence to the person and those which do
not. In addition, adoption of the Louisiana Law Institute's pro-
posed articles on deadly force, which are based upon this dif-
ferentiation, seems desirable, not from the point of view of
punishing the trangressing officer, but rather to help the
conscientious officer stay within prescribed bounds in perform-
ing his duty. Furthermore, it is advocated that the use of
deadly force be limited to those situations where the officer has
knowledge that the suspect has committed a serious felony. In
light of the fact that there are no firm Louisiana cases deciding
this issue, it would appear that such a policy would put Louisiana
in line with developing trends in other American jurisdictions
and in accord with a public policy of limiting the indiscriminate
use of firearms. These suggestions may be brought more clearly
into focus by considering two elements which are needed to
resolve problems in this area. Initially, a comprehensive scheme
of statutory regulations is needed to precisely delineate conduct
which society deems inappropriate to the apprehension of cer-
tain types of criminals. The Law Institute's proposals would
serve this purpose as they fit the above criterion and are sanc-
tioned by Louisiana jurisprudence adopting the deadly-non-
deadly crime dichotomy. Such statutory regulations would only
provide what physical acts were prohibited. Furthermore, since
these acts would remain constant regardless of the remedy chosen
for redress, it is extremely important that they be specifically
set out and understood. Once the impermissible conduct is
firmly standardized, it then becomes appropriate to speak of
possible remedies. It is submitted that the available remedies
will naturally be gauged in accordance with the mental element
involved in breach of the statutory standard of conduct. Thus,
while the standard of conduct will remain constant, the remedy
which will be chosen for its transgression will vary according
to the officer's state of mind at the time of the violation. Secondly,
a realistic scheme of liability distribution, with an eye upon
the goal of an improved police force, should be established. It
is suggested that the municipal corporation, which usually bears
the burden of providing police protection, should also bear the
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responsibility of providing a financially solvent enterprise which
could satisfy a judgment secured by a plaintiff injured through
breach of the above standards. However, because of the increas-'
ing difficulty of the duties of the police force, it is felt that
there should be a differentiation between negligent breaches and
intentional breaches. In the former situation, the officer should,
be disciplined by way of administrative procedure while the
municipality should bear the brunt of a civil judgment for the
torts of its employee. However, in the latter situation, the mental
element makes it desirable that the officer and the municipality
be liable in solido. It is noted that such a scheme presupposes
that the veil of municipal immunity would be lifted as previously
discussed. It is submitted that the adoption of the above proposals
would give our courts the gauge by which to adequately judge
and redress violations of the legal rights of criminal suspects
and would in the end accomplish the purpose of upgrading our
police force.
The problem of inappropriate use of deadly force by a police
.officer is as old and as complicated as the problem of crime
itself. To criminally convict or to civilly condemn the individual
policeman is to treat the symptom while encouraging the disease
to fester. The causes of the problem are an inadequately trained
police force and law in the state of generality to the point of
uselessness. It is only when these causes are eliminated that
the problem will be resolved.
Van R. Mayhall, Jr.
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURE IN LOUISIANA
As of 1966, the United States had between 600,000 and
650,000 persons hospitalized because of mental illness.' Today
more people are involuntarily hospitalized in mental institutions
than are imprisoned for the commission of crime.2 Volumi-
nous research and writing in both the medical and the legal
fields have been concerned with the problems of America's
mentally disturbed. The dilemma of the mentally ill is com-
1. Couch, Book Review, 44 TUL. L REV. 426, 431 (1970). In 1962-63, the
average daily population in Louisiana mental hospitals was 7,188 patients.
Another 10,069 persons were cared for in community clinics. LOUISIANA'S
NEW PLAN-MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 11 (La. State Dep't of Hospitals 1964).
2. Note, 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 187, 188 (1969).
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